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Abstract: Th is article analyzes an “Environmental Education Project” run by the 
Norwegian state oil company Equinor targeting poor women in the seafood pro-
cessing industry along the coastline adjacent to Equinor’s off shore Peregrino fi eld 
in Brazil. Th e project is a prerequisite for Equinor’s operating license, as required 
by Brazilian federal environmental authorities. I analyze the broader sociopolitical 
territory within which the project is implemented, how it is discursively framed 
and institutionally implemented within Equinor Brazil, and how this conjoins 
with the Brazilian state’s regulatory framework. I argue that Brazilian legislation 
and the hands-on approach of authorities uphold Equinor’s commitment to the 
project and bolster Equinor’s CSR practitioners’ capacity to defend it within the 
corporate organization. Th e analysis demonstrates how national legislation and 
political context shape international oil and gas companies’ approaches to CSR.
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In June 2018, a group of about 20 women gath-
ered at a handicraft  and agricultural fair in 
Campos do Goytacazes, a northern coastal oil-
hub city in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Th e 
women were selling cakes and meat pies, straw 
mats, embroidered tablecloths and kitchen 
towels, fi gurines made of seashells, and other 
products typical of regional handicraft  tradi-
tions. While other stalls at the fair identifi ed the 
vendors as belonging to an agricultural cooper-
ative or a quilombo (protected communities de-
scended from African slaves), the women found 
shade under a somewhat diff erently decorated 
party tent, one bearing the logo of the Norwe-
gian oil company Statoil (now Equinor), whose 
majority shareholder is the Norwegian state.
Th e women are part of a long-term environ-
mental education project fi nanced by Equinor, 
aimed at women making a (very meager) liv-
ing in the processing chain of artisan fi shery. 
Th e project, called PEA FOCO (Environmental 
Education Project Strengthening Community 
Organization/ Projeto de Educação Ambiental 
Fortalecimento da Organização Comunitária), 
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provides education in environmental gover-
nance, civic and political rights, and gender 
issues, and seeks to enable the women to pur-
sue alternative and supplementary livelihoods. 
Participating at the fair with homemade hand-
icraft s is an example of the latter. Th e project is 
not a voluntary CSR (corporate social responsi-
bility) project, but a prerequisite of the Brazil-
ian state for Equinor’s operating license in the 
off shore Peregrino fi eld in the Campos basin.1 
While the project itself is run by a contracted 
Brazilian consulting fi rm called TRANS FOR 
MAR, Equinor is the project owner. Equinor 
Brazil reports on the project to the federal 
agency IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of the En-
vironment and Renewable Natural Resources/ 
Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos 
Recursos Naturais Renováveis),2 a subdivision 
of the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment. 
If IBAMA were to be unhappy with the proj-
ect, it could lead to a potentially toilsome em-
broilment between Equinor and IBAMA and 
to delays in future licensing processes, as well 
as a hypothetically worst-case scenario (though 
politically unlikely) of jeopardizing Equinor’s 
current operating license.
Th e Peregrino fi eld, Brazil’s most developed 
off shore fi eld, is located approximately 70 kilo-
meters off  the coast of the state of Rio de Janeiro 
(region Norte Fluminense). Equinor has been 
present in Brazil since 2001 and started pro-
duction in the Peregrino fi eld in 2011 (Equinor 
2020).3 Th e Peregrino fi eld is Equinor’s largest 
operation outside Norway,4 and the company 
has expanded its Brazilian portfolio substan-
tially during recent years. In 2018, Equinor Bra-
zil was singled out as a separate business area 
because the increasing scope and complexity of 
Equinor’s Brazil operations required a more au-
tonomous management structure.
Th e PEA FOCO project has been running 
since 2011. In 2016, it won Equinor’s internal 
SSU (Safety and Sustainability) award as the best 
social sustainability project among all projects 
worldwide. PEA FOCO is also positively viewed 
by Brazilian authorities, which since 2011 have 
obliged oil companies to develop projects ben-
efi ting diff erent disenfranchised social groups 
in impacted onshore communities. At the time 
of fi eld research, the projects in the Campos 
basin (in addition to Equinor’s project) in-
cluded projects targeting fi shermen (Petrobras), 
youth (Chevron), and quilombola communities 
(Shell), as well as an environmental observation 
laboratory (Petrorio).
Th is article seeks to understand the sociopo-
litical and socio-territorial context surrounding 
the PEA FOCO project and the dynamics char-
acterizing the relationship between Equinor 
and Brazilian authorities. To that end, I will 
address three main interrelated research ques-
tions: What are the main contextual characteris-
tics of the region where the PEA FOCO project 
is embedded? How is the project conceptual-
ized by the diff erent actors involved—Equinor, 
IBAMA, the consultancy, and project partici-
pants? And how does the fact that PEA FOCO 
is a legal requirement impact the way it is oper-
ationalized and conceptualized within Equinor?
Th e article is based on four fi eldwork trips to 
Rio de Janeiro and the Campos region in the pe-
riod 2017–2019, where I conducted participant 
observation and unstructured interviews with 
employees in Equinor’s Rio offi  ce, in IBAMA, 
and with the women and consultants in the PEA 
FOCO project.
Analytical facets of CSR
Approaching CSR practices and discourses 
through an ethnographic lens allows us to un-
pack how this policy fi eld is discursively con-
stituted, contextually conceptualized, and prac-
tically enacted under diff erent circumstances 
and in diff erent locations. CSR can best be seen 
as “an evolving and fl exible and overlapping set 
of practices and discourses” (Dolan and Rajak 
2016: 5) that are undercut by the assumption 
that corporations somehow stand in a relation-
ship with and have a responsibility to society. 
What this relationship and responsibility consist 
of is, however, one of the core issues of discor-
dance both within the research community and 
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out in the “real world.” Th e concept originated 
from the United States as a management model 
set in the particular North American ideolog-
ical, political, and fi nancial context, where the 
rationale was to align profi t maximization with 
social expectations (Gjølberg 2010: 204), for ex-
ample through philanthropy. During the past 
decades it has spread throughout the world and 
beyond the business community, and in the 
process has been adapted to diff erent political, 
cultural, and institutional contexts and ideas of 
governance (Gjølberg 2010).
Researchers have deployed a wide variety of 
perspectives to frame diff erent subsets of CSR 
research, ranging from “the business perspec-
tive” on how CSR can contribute to securing 
“the bottom line” to a “societal perspective” that 
investigates CSR’s role and eff ect. While the for-
mer perspective, that is, “the bottom line,” domi-
nated the fi rst phase of CSR research, increasing 
focus has been placed on how it impacts com-
munities and societies (Brejning 2012: 1; see, 
e.g., Rajak 2011; Welker 2014).
Th e literature on CSR has frequently consid-
ered the voluntary—as opposed to mandatory—
aspect as one of its defi ning characteristics 
(Banerjee 2008: 60; Van Aaken et al. 2013: 352). 
However, the fl exibility of CSR as a concept and 
practice implies that it has also been taken to en-
compass other dimensions of business practice 
faced with externally defi ned parameters, such 
as labor regulations and environmental stan-
dards (Brejning 2012: 1). Moreover, the intro-
duction of mandatory CSR provisions in several 
countries has prompted researchers to question 
the voluntary characteristic of the concept and 
call for theory development that encompasses 
both its voluntary and mandatory dimensions 
(Gatti et al. 2017; Waagstein 2011).
Noting that there is no precise defi nition 
of the CSR concept among academics, Maria 
Gjølberg argues that “defi ning CSR is not just a 
technical exercise, but a normative and an ideo-
logical exercise as well” (2010: 205). Research-
ers are thus faced with the fact that conceptual 
clarity of the concept presents itself as an issue 
on two levels; both as regards theoretical defi -
nition of CSR for the purpose of analysis, and 
what kind of actions, guidelines, and policies 
public authorities, corporations, CSR practi-
tioners, and others defi ne as CSR in any given 
empirical context. Comparative discussion thus 
requires “a working defi nition of the concept” 
(Waagstein 2011: 465). For the purpose of the 
analytical focus of this article, I apply a broad 
theoretical defi nition of CSR that encompasses 
both voluntary and mandatory initiatives and 
regulations that go beyond the corporation’s 
core undertaking, and invoke and/or allude to 
the corporation’s responsibility vis-à-vis soci-
ety. Th is working defi nition allows me to situate 
this study within the CSR literature, at the same 
time, it allows for incorporating ethnographic 
fi ndings that reveal diverse emic interpretations 
of whether the PEA FOCO project is regarded 
as CSR or not.
Th e reason for applying this broad defi ni-
tion is that the case presented here represents 
a modality of CSR that goes beyond defi nitions 
of the concept as voluntary initiatives with an 
ostensible social- and community-oriented 
purpose, insofar as it is fi rst, compulsory, and 
second, emerging from the historical develop-
ment of environmental licensing practices in 
Brazil. Within IBAMA there was some discor-
dance as regards to whether these policies were 
conceptually defi ned as something diff erent 
from CSR (e.g., as an evolving legal and insti-
tutional trajectory of environmental licensing 
processes), or whether it was framed and dis-
cussed as part of various modalities (including 
“orthodox” voluntary CSR) in which oil and gas 
(O&G) companies engage with local commu-
nities. From an etic perspective it thus makes 
sense to discuss this case in relation to the CSR 
literature precisely because it illustrates the 
heterogeneity and context-specifi city of busi-
ness-state-society relations and regulations in 
practice, and of the malleability of the ethos that 
corporations have a commitment to society and 
adjacent communities. Th e case also illuminates 
how Equinor Brazil conceives of the project as a 
“hybrid”; both as regards their “social footprint” 
(speaking to the idea of CSR) and “compliance” 
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(speaking to the idea of complying with manda-
tory environmental licensing standards). Th us, 
even though the project is mandatory, it cannot 
be considered exterior to the “traveling idea” of 
CSR (Gjølberg 2010: 205) neither emically nor 
etically.
Hevina Dashwood and Bill Buenar Pu plam -
pu argue that “when assessing a company’s com-
mitment to CSR principles it is important to 
‘unpack’ the fi rm and analyze its internal dy-
namics” (2010: 192). Th e analysis reveals that 
Equinor Brazil’s company structure and hierar-
chy harbor and engender heterogeneous ratio-
nales and perceptions within the corporation 
regarding the role and importance of the PEA 
FOCO project. Inquiry into these dynamics 
reminds us that we must also unpack the dy-
namics between the corporation and the regu-
latory bodies it relates to. Limited ethnographic 
research has been conducted on the interface 
between international O&G corporations and 
their host state (see Welker 2014 for the mining 
sector). However, as this study shows, internal 
and politicized dynamics in the host state in-
fl uence how CSR policies are formulated and 
negotiated within the corporation. Such a multi-
layered and multi-processual perspective allows 
us to take into account a broader panorama of 
factors that shape the fi eld where CSR policies 
are craft ed in a given locality and temporality.
CSR in Brazil
Th e encounter between extractive industries 
in so-called developing countries is character-
ized by diff erent factors than that of extractive 
industries operating in so-called developed 
countries (Hilson 2012). Faulty state structures, 
weak judicial architecture, corruption, frag-
ile civil societies, and the countries’ weak eco-
nomic strength vis-à-vis the companies they are 
hosting, are among the factors that spur compa-
nies to set the terms for their own engagement 
(Hilson 2012). Th erefore, CSR eff orts made by 
O&G companies in developing countries have 
frequently been illusory or even deceiving. A 
major obstacle is the lack of national regulations 
and regulatory bodies, with the implication that 
citizens do not have institutions they can hold 
accountable (Hilson 2012: 133). Consequently, 
Gavin Hilson argues that “for CSR to be eff ec-
tive in any location, there must be a foundation 
of robust regulations and enforcement in place 
for it to complement” (2012: 136, emphasis in 
original). Assuming that Hilson here under-
stands effi  ciency as equivalent to “complying 
with stated goals,” CSR has to work in tandem 
with a state order; it cannot function effi  ciently 
in an institutional and judicial vacuum. Th at is 
not to say that CSR practices in so-called devel-
oped countries do not also raise questions of ac-
countability and power, but a case can be made 
for there being additional layers of challenges 
present in so-called developing countries.
Several factors of Hilson’s analysis hit the 
mark for Brazil. Corruption, large gaps between 
decision makers and civil society, enormous so-
cial inequalities, a judicial and political system 
saturated with elite and corporate power, and 
a long history of environmental destruction 
provide ample space for unaccountable corpo-
rate action. Concurrently, Brazil is one of the 
world’s major emerging economies, oft en re-
ferred to as the BRIC countries.5 It has a long 
history of O&G industry that has fostered the 
establishment of a national expertise, institu-
tional and judicial norms and structures, as well 
as public attention to the extractive economy. 
While mainstream media is decidedly “business 
friendly,” Brazil also has a long history of “coun-
terforces” to corporate and elite power—social 
movements, civil society organizations, and 
progressive intellectuals. Th ese are, however, 
unevenly distributed across Brazil’s enormous 
and heterogeneous territory and are constantly 
fi ghting an uphill battle.
Brazil has a lengthy and bleak record of cor-
porate space for loopholing social and environ-
mental concerns. But the country also has a 
relatively established “CSR movement,” as the 
Brazilian literature coins it, which grew out of 
the post-dictatorship-cum-neoliberal (and in-
creasing poverty) era of the 1990s. Th is CSR 
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tradition has traditionally and predominantly 
been characterized by corporate philanthropy, 
emanating from the industry itself (de Oliveira 
2010; Duarte 2010). But Brazil has also been in 
the forefront of the Latin American continent 
in adapting certifi cation, accountability, and re-
porting practices associated with international 
CSR practices, such as the Global Reporting Ini-
tiative (GRI) (Duarte 2010: 356). Christopher 
Moon, citing the work of Jose Antonio San-
chez-Rodriguez, lists a “CSR timeline” in Brazil, 
consisting of “1960s–1970s: ethical approaches, 
limited impact, infl uenced by Christian values. 
1980s: political approaches, infl uenced by re-
democratization. 1990s: integrative approaches, 
concern with social problems. 2000s: instru-
mental approaches, growing adherence of com-
panies to CSR practices” (Moon 2019: 5). Moon 
furthermore suggests that a new era can be 
added to the timeline: “2010s: values-based ap-
proaches, increasing recognition of the urgency 
of tackling the UN SDGs [sustainable devel-
opment goals] and the new mindsets required 
such as those of eco and social entrepreneur-
ship” (Moon 2019: 25).
While the features indicated above refl ect 
tendencies within industry-driven CSR, envi-
ronmental licensing legislation, which the PEA 
FOCO project analyzed in this article is part of, 
has grown out of a process of policy develop-
ment within the Brazilian state, infl uenced by 
national and international concerns with nature 
conservation and environmental protection.
In the 1970s, Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (EIA) and environmental licensing had 
already been created in state laws in Rio de Ja-
neiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Santa Ca-
tarina (Dias, personal communication, March 
2020). At the federal level, EIA was established 
in 1981 as part of a National Environmental 
Policy (Política Nacional do Meio Ambiente) 
enabling environmental impact assessments of 
industry and infrastructure projects (Dias 2017: 
20). In 1990, a resolution was passed that spec-
ifi ed the criteria for licensing processes tied to 
mineral extraction, and in 1994, an additional 
resolution was passed for the oil and gas in-
dustry (Dias 2017: 276–277n52). In 1986, the 
National Environment Council (CONAMA; O 
Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente) estab-
lished a standard guide on how to do EIA (Dias, 
personal communication, March 2020).
Enforcement of environmental licensing 
processes in the O&G sector were relatively 
slack until Petrobras’s monopoly ended in 1998. 
However, with the subsequent infl ux of foreign 
companies in the O&G sectors, the necessity to 
establish more clearly defi ned guidelines and 
procedures emerged (Dias, personal communi-
cation, August 2019).
Moreover, in 1997, CONAMA Resolution 
237 was passed, which is the main norm that 
regulates environmental licensing in Brazil un-
til today. CONAMA 237 establishes, for the fi rst 
time, that the licensing of off shore oil and gas 
is the exclusive responsibility of IBAMA. Th is 
made it necessary to form technical teams at 
IBAMA specifi cally working with licensing the 
oil and gas industry.
Another important driver for these processes 
was the 1998 law on environmental crimes that 
stated that oil companies without an environ-
mental license could be prosecuted criminally. 
Th ese three factors combined (end of Petro-
bras’s monopoly, CONAMA 237, and the law 
on environmental crimes) contributed to the 
advance of oil licensing in the late 1990s (Dias, 
personal communication, March 2020).
An interesting feature of the present case 
is therefore that the current regulatory frame-
work set by IBAMA is a piece of state legisla-
tion whereby a so-called developing country is 
attempting to regulate and concretize interna-
tional O&G companies’ responsibility toward 
their host communities and Brazilian society, 
and to create a state-sanctioned system for reg-
ulating and monitoring how they manage this 
responsibility. As such, it can therefore be con-
ceptualized as a part of what Dirk Matten and 
Jeremy Moon refer to as “implicit CSR”: “cor-
porations’ role within the wider formal and 
informal institutions for society’s interests and 
concerns. Implicit CSR normally consists of val-
ues, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory 
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and customary) requirements for corporations 
to address stakeholder issues and that defi ne 
proper obligations of corporate actors in collec-
tive rather than individual terms” (Matten and 
Moon 2008: 409).
As we will explore, this policy is, however, 
contingent upon deeply political processes and 
struggles inside the Brazilian state. Consequently, 
current legislation and enforcement capacities 
are vulnerable to political change and volatility. 
Indeed, as this article is written, current presi-
dent Jair Bolsonaro is very vocal in his quest for 
removing environmental and social “obstacles” 
to corporate free reign. Th is includes underfund-
ing and attacking state institutions responsible 
for regulating and overseeing such concerns, 
including IBAMA. But before we learn more 
about IBAMA’s role in setting the agenda for en-
vironmental licensing processes, let us fi rst get a 
fuller picture of the Campos region where these 
policies are unfolding.
Industrial development 
in the Campos region
Oil was fi rst discovered in the Campos Basin in 
1974 and production started in 1977. In 1997, 
extraction and production of oil was opened 
to foreign companies with the passing of Law 
no.9.478/97, also known as the Oil Law. Th is 
ended the monopoly of Petrobras, the Brazil-
ian state oil company, which had been in eff ect 
since the full nationalization (excluding distri-
bution) of the Brazilian oil industry in 1953 (de 
Medeiros Costa et al. 2015: 5).6
Th e 1997 Oil Law introduced the payment of 
royalties and “special participation”7 to munic-
ipalities near oil camps (Neto et al. 2008: 184). 
Th e region, previously marginalized from cap-
italist investments in Brazil, not only suddenly 
received a large infl ux of revenue, but also a 
disproportionate share (in relation to other re-
gions) of private direct investment attracted 
to O&G activities and industrial development. 
Th is set off  a “war between places” (guerra de lu-
gares) as the diff erent municipalities competed 
for additional industry-related investments from 
foreign and domestic capital (Neto et al. 2008). 
Th e result has been a fragmentation of the re-
gional territory, as the diff erent municipalities 
design their own development strategies to at-
tract investments. Th e infl ux of royalties, rather 
than going to social development for the benefi t 
of the general population, has to a large extent 
been channeled into infrastructure facilitating 
industrial development (Neto et al. 2008).
Industrial and extractive activities in the 
region have had multiple eff ects on local live-
lihoods. Fishers complain about the impacts 
of the oil fi elds in the form of encroachment 
on marine space, exclusion from safety zones, 
increased circulation of large vessels, and seis-
mic activities (Petrobras 2014: 166). Th e habi-
tat created by the oil platform pillars as well as 
waste from the platforms have pushed fi sh away 
from natural habitats. Th e safety zones, with a 
radius of 500 meters, bar fi shers from access 
to these new marine habitats. If they do enter 
the zones—and some do because of the poten-
tially high reward—they run the risk of being 
boarded and fi ned by the Brazilian Navy.
Fishers have an additional problem even 
closer to home: the Porto do Açu Industrial 
Complex in São João da Barra municipality. 
Covering 130 km2, the complex constitutes the 
largest industrial investment in Latin America. 
Th e building phase of the port was marked by 
tense confl ict, involving land appropriation, 
house demolitions, and violent forced removals. 
Th e port, now in operation, is still heavily con-
tested because of the trail of broken promises of 
local employment and economic opportunity 
left  in its wake, and because it has barred fi shers 
from access to their best shrimp fi shing grounds 
as well as to the port traditionally used for rest, 
off -loading, and refueling.
Th e Campos region has thus, since the turn 
of the millennium, become a space for far-reach-
ing transformation as a consequence of diverse 
industrial development. It has experienced an 
investment and royalty “rush,” but without po-
litical structures or political will to invest the 
money in social development. It has become a 
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site of expectations and increasing frustrations, 
as traditional livelihoods are crowded out and 
increased opportunities for education and work 
fail to materialize.
Licensing O&G activities
Th e impact area for the Peregrino fi eld stretches 
from the city of Niterói north of Rio de Janeiro 
to the northern border between the state of 
Rio de Janeiro and the state of Espiritu Santo. 
As a condition for their licenses to explore and 
to operate, O&G companies must run projects 
in selected communities along the coastline. 
PCAP projects (Compensation Plan for Fish-
ery Activities/Plano de Compensação da Ativ-
idade Pesqueira) tied to the license-to-explore, 
are short-term compensatory projects aimed 
at mitigating potential economic loss in fi shing 
communities caused by exploration activities. 
PEA projects (Environmental Education Proj-
ects/Programa de Educação Ambiental) are tied 
to the license-to-operate. Th ese are long-term 
environmental education projects, aimed at 
both educating vulnerable citizen groups about 
the impacts of O&G activities and enabling 
them to participate in political and public de-
cision-making processes. Th e companies are 
also to organize social communications projects 
informing coastal populations about their pres-
ence and activities.8
Th e regulatory underpinning for PEA and 
PCAP projects is the Nota Técnica CGPEG/
DLIIC/IBAMA Nº 02/10, the Technical Note 
elaborated by IBAMA setting the guidelines 
for conditions tied to the licensing process. Th e 
rationale for the PEA projects is formulated as 
“the necessity to develop formative processes 
to aid qualifi ed intervention of certain social 
groups in decision-making processes [related 
to] the costs/benefi ts emerging from the explo-
ration of natural resources” (IBAMA 2010: 5, 
author’s translation from Portuguese). In other 
words, the aim of PEA projects is to mobilize 
socio-politically marginalized groups and en-
able them to engage with the direct and indi-
rect consequences of O&G activities. Before we 
venture into the details of Equinor’s PEA FOCO 
project, it is worthwhile to take a closer look 
at the institutional setting within the Brazilian 
state where these policies were conceived.
IBAMAs contested politics
IBAMA’s main offi  ce is located in the capital 
city of Brasilia, but the technical division re-
sponsible for the oil and gas sector is located 
in Rio de Janeiro. Th e O&G division is the only 
subdivision located outside Brasilia. Many of 
the current generation of senior technicians 
entered IBAMA in a broad public servant re-
cruitment process in 1999. Within the Brazilian 
academic and political landscape, a number had 
a progressive background with studies in social 
and environmental sciences during the years of 
conservationist struggle of the Amazonia, the 
murder of Chico Mendez,9 and the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development.
In 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the 
presidential election for the Workers’ Party (PT; 
Partido dos Trabalhadores). Th is coincided 
favorably with the ambitions of the incoming 
technical staff , who were eager to develop a 
more comprehensive and substantive frame-
work for the environmental licensing process 
than had previously been the case. Under the 
fi rst Lula government (2003–2006), the Rio of-
fi ce was shielded from external pressure from 
the industry and from adversarial political in-
terests. Th e directorate for IBAMA is politically 
appointed, which in a Latin American context 
means that political pressure and directives are 
fi ltered downward according to the ambitions 
and interest of the person in charge—as well 
as the ambitions and interests of those who put 
him or her there. Under the fi rst Lula admin-
istration, the government appointed directors 
who shared the Rio offi  ce’s ambitions for a re-
newed and strengthened environmental licens-
ing procedure and who allowed them to develop 
their internal organization and knowledge base. 
Consequently, the Rio offi  ce consolidated itself 
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as a highly knowledgeable and tightly knit divi-
sion, with little overturn in personnel and close 
knowledge of the O&G industry.
With the second Lula government and the 
subsequent Dilma Rousseff  government, inter-
nal political struggles hardened. On several oc-
casions, new directors were appointed that had 
interests and ambitions adverse to the Rio offi  ce, 
and more political pressure was “fi ltered down.” 
Th e Rio offi  ce had by then, however, consol-
idated suffi  ciently to manage to stand their 
ground, or as one senior technician formulated 
it: “many times I thought that it was over, but 
we are still here.” Nonetheless, the battle to 
maintain their space and leverage is ongoing. 
In 2017, the director’s seat of the Rio offi  ce was 
moved to Brasilia, because the Brasilia main of-
fi ce thought that the Rio division was becoming 
too autonomous.
Th e Rio-based IBAMA team’s strategic vision 
is founded in critical environmental education: 
an intellectual and ideological tradition that 
emerges from conservationist struggles in the 
past and the tradition of popular education (ed-
ucação popular)—oft en associated with the Bra-
zilian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire. In 
the fi rst decade of the millennium, the Rio divi-
sion started to develop and test politically how a 
new strategy for environmental licensing could 
be developed that incorporated these ideas into 
formal policy. Eventually, this strategy was for-
malized in the Technical Note referred to above.
Th e companies initially put up resistance to 
IBAMA’s new clout and strategy. However, as 
one IBAMA employee expressed, “it helps a lot 
to have legislation that is strong and not only on 
paper. [Th e O&G companies] started out with a 
lot of resistance, but now they have fallen into 
the fold.” One of the analysts stated that the big 
diff erence between how O&G companies be-
have in Brazil and in other developing countries 
is the existence or not of state regulation. “If 
you do not have state regulation, the companies 
only do voluntary projects: ephemeral projects 
without a base. But IBAMA has the possibility 
to demand something that is sustainable in the 
long run.”
Before IBAMA developed the current en-
vironmental licensing strategy, the companies 
were used to doing “things without criteria,” as 
one technician put it. Moreover, Petrobras had 
a long history of dispensing “white elephants” 
and paternalistic gift s and trinkets to local com-
munities,10 and it was therefore of crucial im-
portance for IBAMA that companies did not 
reinforce this patronage model. Th e Technical 
Note outlined that the companies had to com-
municate consistently that the projects were a 
legal requirement. All branding, promotional, 
and educational material—written or audio-
visual—was required to include the phrase: 
“Th e realization of the [name of the project] is 
a means of (indemnization, mitigation, and/or 
compensation) required by the environmental 
licensing process, led by IBAMA” (IBAMA 2010: 
29, author’s translation from Portuguese).11
Th e analysts agreed that, had state regula-
tions not been in place, the companies would 
not have carried out projects of such scope and 
focus as they now had to. Th is was a matter of 
both will and capacity. “Th ey have the money, 
but not the theoretical or methodological tools,” 
one IBAMA employee commented. “Th ey would 
rather do social responsibility projects.” Th e 
companies thus had to be brought to heel with 
regards to following the theoretical and meth-
odological guidelines of the strategy. It was not 
the companies themselves that developed the 
projects. Rather, they made a public call invit-
ing consultancies to submit projects in align-
ment with IBAMAs Technical Note. IBAMA 
participated in selecting the project, and the 
fi nal project plan was developed in cooperation 
between the consultancy, the corporation, and 
IBAMA. Although IBAMA could not deter-
mine the size of the companies’ budgets spent 
on PCAP and PEA projects, they could assess 
whether the budgets were realistic considering 
the projects’ scope and ambitions. IBAMA also 
had close contact with the consultancy (and the 
corporations), and regularly visited the projects 
in the fi eld.
Equinor was considered one of the better, if 
not the best, O&G companies in terms of their 
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handling of the environmental licensing pro-
cess. Equinor worked “in alignment” (alinhado) 
with IBAMA instead of engaging in “posturing” 
as some of the larger companies did (with Petro-
bras being considered the most challenging 
company to work with, being bureaucratically 
sluggish and reluctant to submit to IBAMA’s au-
thority). PEA FOCO was also considered best 
practice in terms of ongoing PEA projects. One 
of the analysts qualifi ed this statement, how-
ever, commenting that Equinor had been very 
lucky with the consultancy, and that theirs was 
a rather small, cheap, and easy project to han-
dle. In response to my attempt to tease out more 
details about their views on Equinor’s perfor-
mance, one technician was evidently reluctant 
to dispense praise, stating that the companies 
(in general) were “merely following the law.” 
Th is comment illustrates IBAMA’s eagerness to 
entrench the idea that these projects were legal 
obligations to the Brazilian state and society, 
not contingent upon the companies’ good will. 
One technician commented that the companies 
(without specifying which) were reluctant to 
start the projects, but once they went well and 
were positively evaluated, they were very eager 
to “appropriate it,” that is, to pass it off  as “their 
brain child.” For that reason, as stated above, 
IBAMA was very cautious that the companies 
did not use the projects for corporate branding 
and publicity, neither toward the broader public 
or vis-à-vis the local “stakeholders,” such as in 
the communities where the project operated. 
Th is illustrates how the environmental educa-
tion projects, albeit mandatory, reverberate with 
the practices and ideas associated with CSR, 
both within the corporations, the public, and 
the state, in spite of the IBAMA’s intention to 
draw a sharp conceptual line between legal re-
quirement and voluntary CSR practices.
Th e PEA FOCO project
Equinor’s PEA FOCO project covers nine dif-
ferent fi sher communities: Atafona, Açu, and 
Quixaba in the municipality of São João da 
Barra; and Barra de Itabapoana, Barrinha, Gar-
gaú, Guaxindiba, Lagoa Feia, and Sossego in the 
municipality of São Francisco de Itabapoana. 
In 2014, and at the behest of IBAMA’s recom-
mendation—or rather requirement—Equinor 
also integrated a PCAP project for a previous 
and unsuccessful exploration in the Juxia well 
(block BM-C-4712). In practice that means that 
the PEA FOCO project (now also integrating 
the PCAP project) is scheduled to continue un-
til production in the Peregrino fi eld ends.
In 2014, the women formed a registered asso-
ciation called AMA PEA FOCO (Association of 
Women supported by PEA FOCO/Associação 
de Mulheres Apoiadoras do PEA FOCO). Th e 
association’s judicial status allows them to so-
licit representation in formal municipal con-
sultative councils and to solicit audiences with 
political bodies. Th rough the association, they 
collectively discussed and voted for establishing 
two communal industrial kitchens in the two 
target municipalities. Th e kitchens are funded 
by Equinor as part of the project, but formally 
belong to AMA PEA FOCO. Th e kitchens thus 
have multiple functions responding to the dual 
aims of PEA and PCAP: to function as orga-
nizational and mobilizing meeting spaces (in 
alignment with the purpose of collective em-
powerment of marginalized groups); and to 
enable the women to develop cooking and or-
ganizational skills to strengthen their economic 
livelihoods (in alignment with the purpose of 
mitigating potential economic loss due to O&G 
activities).
PEA FOCO and women in the region
Th e PEA FOCO project has been developed 
and is run by a contracted environmental con-
sultancy, TRANS FOR MAR, which specializes 
in sustainability projects in the coastal region. 
TRANS FOR MAR has three people employed 
as fi eld staff  with combined backgrounds from 
popular education, the arts, and environmental 
governance studies. Th e company also has one 
administrative coordinator and one didactic/
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pedagogic coordinator. All TRANS FOR MAR 
staff  are women.13 Two local women from the 
project work as administrative assistants. Th e 
project also hires other professionals as needed 
(e.g., cooks to hold cooking classes).
Th e PEA FOCO project is neither couched 
nor conducted as a politically partisan project; 
rather, it is explicitly non-partisan. However, 
its pedagogical design takes inspiration from 
the tradition of popular education and critical 
pedagogy in Brazil. A key tenet of this tradition 
is that subaltern groups must develop knowl-
edge about the structural conditions for their 
marginalization, learn to think of themselves 
as political, acting subjects, and develop collec-
tive emancipatory strategies in order for social 
transformation to occur.14
Women in the seafood processing sector on 
the Norte Fluminense coastline are decidedly 
marginalized. Historically a sugar cane planta-
tion region, the area is culturally conservative 
with patriarchal, racialized, and religious social 
ideologies marginalizing women of color and 
low socio-economic status in particular. Th e 
political apparatus is dominated by elite fam-
ily dynasties that thrive on patronage and cli-
entelism. Corruption and unresponsive public 
institutions are, as in most of Brazil, the norm 
rather than the exception.
Labor in the seafood processing industry has 
historically been regarded not as “proper work,” 
but rather as women “helping” their husbands 
alongside their household duties. Th ese percep-
tions remain to a large extent.15 Consequently, 
female fi shery workers have not had any occu-
pational class identity nor any form of repre-
sentation or social organization. Th ey have no 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the owners of the 
processing facilities. Women’s salaries are sub-
stantially lower than that of male fi shers and, 
not least, than the profi ts reaped by re-vendors. 
Th e offi  cially recognized Fishermen’s Colonies 
(Colonias de Pescadores), which organize and 
register male fi shers in the public fi shermen’s 
registry, had neither registered female fi shery 
workers nor acknowledged them as such—
until the PEA FOCO project started to push for 
it. Being on this list entitles fi shers to economic 
compensation during the spawning period 
when fi shing is forbidden16 as well as pension 
and health coverage.
Th e spatial design of the area itself accentuates 
women’s marginalization: villages are scattered 
over long distances and public transportation 
is extremely neglected. Consequently, women 
are generally physically immobile and hindered 
from gaining access to public institutions, social 
arenas, and knowledge about the outside world. 
Female illiteracy is high, especially among el-
derly and middle-aged women. Many dropped 
out of school early either to work in the fi shing 
industry to help sustain family or because of 
early marriage and/or early pregnancy (which 
still is prevalent). Public education in the area 
has also been, and to a certain extent still is, 
poor. Moreover, the absence of a regional tradi-
tion for popular social organization has further 
contributed to low political awareness and few 
arenas for collective mobilization.
PEA FOCO and women’s lives
Th is panorama represents the context as well as 
the justifi cation for the PEA FOCO project. Th e 
comprehensiveness of female seafood work-
ers’ marginalization was not lost on Equinor’s 
Brazilian SSU-consultant, who referred to it 
as “modern slavery.” In 2011, the PEA FOCO 
project started with a year of door-to-door mo-
bilization in the nine project communities (con-
ducted by the consultancy), aimed at identifying 
and recruiting women in the target group. Sub-
sequent phases included the formation of vil-
lage nucleus and popular educators in each of 
the target communities as well as the diff usion 
of the educational and pedagogical content of 
the project. In keeping with the tradition of 
popular education and popular mobilization 
in Brazil, TRANS FOR MAR staff  has formed 
close social and personal ties with the women. 
In addition to regular workshops, meetings and 
events both at community and municipal lev-
els, as well as in the city of Campos, the project 
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staff  conducts regular house visits. Th e under-
lying rationale for this proximity is the need to 
be close to the women’s social realities and life 
worlds; the project facilitators cannot act as dis-
tant come-and-go external consultants.
Th roughout the years, several hundred 
women have participated in events organized 
by the project. At the moment there is a “hard 
core” of around 35–40 women who participate 
in events at the municipal level and many more 
who participate at the local “nucleus” level.
Th e project has had a transformative eff ect 
on many of the women’s lives. It has provided 
them with a broad array of new knowledge and 
information and become an arena where they 
get social support for personal growth. One of 
the participants in her fi ft ies, who makes a liv-
ing from river fi shing, fi lleting fi sh, and selling 
food products from her home, words it like this:
I got to know the project through a col-
league, and we started to attend meetings 
together. I wanted to go and see what it 
was about. I knew that [the oil compa-
nies] are extracting our oil and gas, and 
I went to the meetings and understood 
more about it. Th rough the project, I 
learned about my rights and then I started 
to ask questions—my husband said that 
I had become a busybody. Th rough the 
project I get support and learn how to re-
solve things.
Although the project as such does not pros-
elytize “gender equality,” it has increased gen-
der awareness and self-confi dence as well as 
fomented occupational class identities. Many 
of the women said that they had never thought 
of themselves as workers before. Th erefore, they 
had not contemplated that they deserved labor 
rights and social entitlements as well. Several of 
the women told stories of how they had expe-
rienced radical transformations in their lives, 
such as daring to speak up in a group for the 
fi rst time, no longer following conservative re-
ligious doctrines in the communities, and aban-
doning abusive labor relations. Th e current main 
coordinator in the fi eld, a strong-willed, kind-
hearted woman in her late fi ft ies with a long 
history of engagement with popular sector com-
munities, has become an important supportive 
fi gure for many whose lives are fi lled with the 
usual tragedies that befall women living in pov-
erty: illness, death, domestic violence, severe 
economic problems, material defi cits, children 
who fall into misfortune, and abuse and neglect 
by political and public institutions. As PEA has 
evolved into the association AMA PEA FOCO, 
TRANS FOR MAR has helped them petition 
municipal authorities for better or missing pub-
lic services as well as the Fishermen’s Colonies 
and the Ministry of Fishery in order to be in-
cluded on the Fishermen’s Registries. Th e latter 
has been of particularly great symbolic impor-
tance for the women in addition to its economic 
signifi cance.17 Moreover, AMA PEA FOCO has 
been able to get elected for one seat and one 
deputy seat as representatives for civil society 
in two municipal councils (health and environ-
ment). While these minor victories are unlikely 
to have a signifi cant impact upon political and 
gendered inequalities in the region and in the 
larger picture, for the women involved it does 
represent a politics of hope (Appadurai 2007) 
insofar as it has provided them with a space to 
collectively articulate grievances and formulate 
claims. Th ere are however evidently also deep 
tensions between the signifi cance that the proj-
ect has for the women involved, and the larger 
structural and political landscape that these 
policies form part of. Th is aspect will be further 
discussed toward the end. For now, we will leave 
the dusty fi shing villages in the Campos region, 
and return to Rio de Janeiro, where we will see 
that there are also tensions between diff erent 
ways of perceiving and conceptualizing the 
project within Equinor.
Negotiating PEA FOCO
Th e 2016 SSU award that Equinor Brazil re-
ceived for the PEA FOCO project is discreetly 
on display in the slick and shining lobby of its 
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Rio de Janeiro offi  ce building, located near Praia 
do Flamengo in the upscale Flamengo area. Dis-
ciplined staff  is working quietly in large, spacious 
and modern offi  ce spaces with a stunning view 
of Sugarloaf Mountain and the Guanabara Bay 
on the edge of Rio de Janeiro. In all respects, this 
offi  ce space and the communities where the PEA 
FOCO project is unfolding are worlds apart.
Th e PEA FOCO project falls under the re-
sponsibility of the social performance consul-
tant.18 In 2015, this desk was downsized from 
three persons when the slump in oil prizes made 
Equinor’s Oslo offi  ce instruct the Brazil offi  ce to 
cut costs. Th e social performance offi  cer reports 
to the head of Sustainability, Security, and Emer-
gency response. Th at person in turn reports to 
the vice president of SSU (Safety, Security, and 
Sustainability) in Brazil’s autonomous country 
board known as Development and Production 
Brazil (DPB).19 Th e head of SSU in turn reports 
to Equinor Brazil’s CEO.
Th e long-term presence of socially commit-
ted CSR staff  with an acquired understanding 
of local issues is vital to ensure the long-term 
management of projects. Staff  with a technical/
managerial approach may not understand local 
complexities or have a suffi  ciently qualitative 
methodological understanding of how best to 
engage with local communities (Frynas 2005: 
591). In that respect, Equinor Brazil has been 
lucky, or perhaps wise, when picking staff  to 
handle their Social Performance portfolio. In 
the course of my fi eld research, there have been 
two diff erent persons in charge, Th omás and 
Sarah.20 Both had previous experience from 
community consultancy and were commended 
both by TRANS FOR MAR staff  and the women 
for having a genuine understanding of and in-
terest in the nitty-gritty details of developing a 
project embedded in such challenging and com-
plex socio-political realities. As one TRANS 
FOR MAR employee said: “Th e diff erence be-
tween Equinor and other companies is that you 
can discuss process with them, not just result.” 
Another positive trait mentioned was the level 
of trust between the company and consultancy, 
in stark contrast to Brazilian energy companies. 
Moreover, Equinor was more reasonable when 
negotiating contracts and budgets than other 
O&G companies and, in general, respected the 
consultancy’s expertise and let them do their 
work.
Marina Welker (2014) remarks that CSR of-
fi cers are oft en viewed with suspicion by their 
co-workers. Constituting one of the “ameliora-
tive disciplines” (alongside, e.g., environment, 
health, and HR [human resources]) they oft en 
have to fi ght for their legitimacy and justify 
their existence more than those in technical 
and managerial areas (Welker 2014: 41). While 
I have no reason to believe that Equinor’s SSU 
staff  was viewed with suspicion, it was evident 
that they found themselves in a betwixt-and-be-
tween position where they had to mediate be-
tween “the project out there” and “corporate 
realities in here.” A lot of “translation work” 
went into transforming the qualitative aspects 
of the project into corporate molds.
At our fi rst meeting, Th omás told me that the 
SSU department had developed a new strategy 
aft er the 2015 budget cuts. At the time, they had 
a project called Women of Gamboa, also work-
ing with female seafood workers. However, this 
project was voluntary, and the person sent from 
the Norway offi  ce to steer budget cuts had not 
agreed to keeping it.21 Th e CSR desk was down-
sized from three people to one person and only 
the mandatory projects remained. “Th e others 
were not related to the company’s corporate 
growth strategy,” Th omás said.
Th e centrality of the trope and rationale of 
“the business case” in relation to CSR has been 
thoroughly explored in the literature (Trebeck 
2008). Equinor’s Brazil SSU department had 
over previous years worked deliberately to make 
“the business case” for their projects more visi-
ble to the board. Th omás’s then superior com-
mented that:
When I got the position, I saw a [social 
sustainability] strategy without a direct 
connection to the company strategy. We 
had to make building blocks. And we also 
have to link it to Brazil Roadmap 2030 
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. . . the company’s ambition, the pillars, 
are to create value to communities and to 
act with transparency. Th at is the line of 
action that the social investment strategy 
should be linked to—everything should 
be connected.
Consequently, the SSU team elaborated a 
comprehensive document linking IBAMA’s de-
mands with Equinor’s own guidelines, values, 
and strategies, featuring an elaborate fl owchart 
showing how these synergized with the goals 
and purposes for PEA FOCO. Neat numerical 
tables summarized the achievements of the PEA 
FOCO project in the fi eld.
Somewhat puzzling is the fact that the SSU 
department had to “justify” and enumerate a 
state-sanctioned mandatory project. I suggest 
that this refl ects the hegemony of corporate 
cognitive models that require “legibility” (Scott 
1999) in the form of condensed numerical and 
schematic depictions of the world. Qualitative 
“stuff ” becomes anomalies and empty signifi ers 
once it reaches the boardroom; or, as one of the 
SSU staff  formulated it:
We have to make performance indicators 
for each project. We have a lot of good 
projects: what are the indicators for that; 
how can we show the leadership? We do 
not convince people [within Equinor] 
with perceptions, we have to present 
numbers: how many women trained; the 
kitchens; number of meetings. When you 
go there to see for yourself: see Th omás 
with the women, how they hug him and 
cry—you see that they are happy. But for 
those who are not in the fi eld [e.g., the 
board], you need numbers.
I suggest that the necessity to make leg-
ible the synergies between Equinor’s values 
and strategies and PEA FOCO’s existence and 
achievement also refl ects an organizational 
set-up where each department has to justify 
and defend its budget in competition with other 
units. In that process, “the social area” has to de-
fend their existence shoulder-to-shoulder with, 
for example, the unit in charge of “core activ-
ities,” such as exploration and drilling. It then 
makes sense that for a corporate gaze search-
ing for legibility, such a document represents a 
“truth claim” that makes the social budget more 
diffi  cult to challenge. Th e strategy worked, as it 
were. In the 2018 budget, the SSU department 
got what they asked for from the board, I was 
told.
Th e boundaries of responsibility
In conversations with Equinor staff , PEA FOCO 
was discursively framed within vexing ratio-
nales. I was told that “we need to have a social 
footprint” and that they wanted to leave some-
thing with “lasting value,” in contrast to assis-
tentialist and philanthropic donations. I was 
also told that the project’s rationales fi t well with 
the two internal sustainability pillars: to create 
local value and to act with transparency. Be-
cause, it was explained, “when we do work in 
the communities, it creates local value [e.g., it 
leaves material and social resources in the com-
munities]. And when the women go to public 
institutions with their demands, that creates 
transparency.”
However, at other times, Equinor staff  stated 
quite bluntly that the rationale was, above all, 
corporate not altruistic. Orthodox CSR speech 
was recurrent in our conversations: “to achieve 
the social license to operate,” “compliance,” 
“business strategy,” and “mitigating expecta-
tions.” One interlocutor commented that: “Th e 
purpose is to build trust, to build relationship. 
Of course, there is no such thing as a free lunch. 
We do this because we want to do good, but also 
because we hope that in the future, they do not 
challenge us. It opens doors, builds relation-
ships, so in the future we can get their social 
license to operate.”
Th e company was fearful of running into 
problems with local communities, and they had 
procedures in place for how to deal with any 
issue that might arise. For the company, public 
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relations involve a constant boundary-mak-
ing process (Appel 2012) where expectations 
are mitigated, claims kept in check, and social 
grievances averted. Th is is not to say that the 
individual staff ’s “moral orientation” (Trebeck 
2008: 350) was not genuine, or that the impor-
tance—or desire—of leaving a “social footprint” 
is not incorporated into Equinor’s business phi-
losophy. However, it points to the corporation’s 
raison d’être—to keep doing business—which 
serves as a “metacode” (Rottenburg 2009) that 
triumphs and frames supplementary rationales.
Equinor’s corporate self-understanding is 
founded upon self-reassurance about the possi-
bility of doing business with a clean conscience. 
However, what it means to have a clean con-
science evidently depends on what you consider 
your responsibility. Upon being asked where, in 
his opinion, a company’s responsibility starts and 
ends, one of the managers responded that “the 
simple answer is that it starts with compliance. 
What you need to do. PEA and PCAP are com-
pliance. And then you might want to do other 
things that are not compliance, other projects.”
What the manager points to is the distinc-
tion between what in corporate lingo is referred 
to as “have to have” and “nice to have.” Volun-
tary projects fall into the category of “nice to 
have.” PEA FOCO, however, was defi ned as 
“compliance.” It follows from the parameters 
of measuring compliance that the yardstick for 
the project’s success was IBAMA’s stamp of ap-
proval, though for the staff  involved, it clearly 
also mattered that the project went well.
PEA FOCO’s status as a matter of com-
pliance was codifi ed and condensed into the 
phrase oft en uttered by all parties involved: 
“what IBAMA wants.” However, as we learned 
above, “what IBAMA wants” was part of a broad 
and contested political struggle that reveals the 
heterogeneity of the Brazilian state as well as 
IBAMA’s fragile clout. Th ese dynamics expose 
that as much as O&G companies try to pose as 
a-political market actors in countries such as 
Brazil, they are nevertheless deeply engaged in 
vexing and contested power relations within the 
Brazilian state and society.
Concluding thoughts: 
Th e politics of compliance
Th is article has explored the socio-territorial 
and sociopolitical context for the PEA FOCO 
project; a context that is also the justifi cation for 
IBAMA’s ambition to oblige O&G companies to 
contribute toward the betterment of the social 
and human development along the Norte Flu-
minense coastline.
In and of itself, the PEA FOCO project has 
had signifi cant personal importance for many 
of the women involved, and it has also contrib-
uted to raising the question of women’s status as 
fi shery laborers in their families and communi-
ties. Albeit modestly, and with great diffi  culty, 
it has also provided the women with a venue 
for advocacy vis-à-vis local political bodies. In 
the larger picture, however, the project forms 
part of a broader context of deep structural in-
equalities shaping the encounter between the 
international oil and gas sector and marginal-
ized fi shing communities (Quist 2019). In such 
a perspective, the project can be read in light of 
Elana Shever’s (2010) highly critical account of 
how Shell in Argentina “used gendered prac-
tices and aff ective techniques both to quell 
opposition to the company’s operations and to 
foster individual and collective—but not corpo-
rate—responsibility for human health and wel-
fare” (Shever 2010: 28). Th e project also raises 
highly complex questions of how to analyze the 
fact that O&G companies are mandated by one 
central state body to empower marginalized 
groups’ ability to critically engage with the O&G 
companies themselves—as well as local political 
bodies and state institutions—yet in a context 
where all parties involved strive to appear apo-
litical and a-partisan.
IBAMA seemed well aware of these para-
doxes. However, their point of departure ap-
peared to be a pragmatic realization of the fact 
that the O&G companies were there to stay. It is 
thus preferable to nudge them into recognizing 
the larger socio-territorial context within which 
they are operating, and to make them engage 
with the communities that are aff ected by their 
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productive and economic presence. It is also 
preferable that the state is in charge of designing 
and coordinating strategies for mitigating some 
of these impacts, instead of leaving it up to the 
corporations themselves. Th rough IBAMAs 
progressive-developmental gaze, it hence made 
sense to make corporations contribute with a 
grain of sand to strengthen those groups who 
suff ered the most from Brazil’s democratic, so-
cial, and civic defi ciencies.
Christina Garsten and Kertin Jacobsson 
(2013) discuss CSR as a post-political form of 
governance. However, I suggest that IBAMA’s 
environmental licensing process, as a modality 
of mandatory CSR policies, or what Matten and 
Moon (2008) referred to above as “implicit CSR,” 
constitutes a tacit politicization of CSR. However, 
the risk is of course that these projects serve as 
lightning rods for more critical discussions about 
O&G companies’ direct and indirect role in rein-
forcing the very same problems that the projects 
are intended to mitigate. Such discussions are 
beyond the scope of this article. But as we have 
seen, the tension between the PEA FOCO proj-
ect’s signifi cance for the women involved, and 
the structural and political context within which 
it is embedded, is evidently deeply present.
It is pertinent to ask: does Equinor’s “best 
practice” social performance in Brazil re-
fl ect something particular about the “Nordic 
model”? (See Introduction to this special issue.) 
Without having done comparative fi eldwork in 
non-Nordic companies operating in the same 
business environment and being subjected to 
the same regulations, it is diffi  cult to make a 
conclusive argument about there being some-
thing particularly “Nordic” about Equinor Bra-
zil’s project management. However, the research 
material indicates that Equinor Brazil has run 
the PEA FOCO project in a manner that refl ects 
that the organization readily accepts the Brazil-
ian state’s regulations as well as comprehending 
its rationale. Moreover, research material also 
indicates that Equinor Brazil is trying to run the 
project in a conscientious manner, not only for 
the purpose of ticking a “compliance box.”
However, the material also suggests that it 
is IBAMA’s institutional, legal, and political 
clout that upholds PEA FOCO’s space within 
Equinor’s organization. As the termination of 
the Women of Gamboa project indicates, the 
corporate bottom line as well as criteria of leg-
ibility levied upon formulations of corporate 
strategies means that “nice to have” projects 
stand on unstable ground. Th e bottom-line ra-
tionale for the PEA FOCO project within the 
corporate matrix is thus its status as a manda-
tory project, individual CSR staff ’s personal en-
gagements in the project notwithstanding.
Th e case also raises questions concerning 
the circumstances under which host states have 
maneuvering space for steering CSR policies of 
O&G companies operating in their country, and 
what is required to enforce these policies. As this 
case attests, this space is contingent upon a host 
of contextual factors, actors involved, and po-
litical conjunctures. As I have shown, IBAMA 
engages in a two-front struggle: to nudge the 
companies into accepting their authority and 
demands, but also to maintain their space in 
the midst of political struggles for control of the 
state. Th is case thus illuminates the deeply po-
litical dimension of CSR as a relation of power 
both within the state and between the state and 
corporations. However, the present research 
suggests that corporations can, if suffi  cient in-
stitutional and political power is in place, be 
pushed into committing to long-term projects 
where the state has a say in defi ning objectives 
and methodologies (as opposed to voluntary 
“philanthropy”). However, the quality of the fol-
low-up (as opposed to “ticking a box”) evidently 
also depends on institutional set-ups and man-
agement inside the corporation. Equinor Bra-
zil’s SSU staff  has worked closely with IBAMA to 
make sure that they are complying with “what 
IBAMA wants” in qualitative terms also. It re-
mains to be seen what will happen with Brazil’s 
environmental licensing process and the PEA 
FOCO project should IBAMA lose their clout 
in the future. Th at would be a litmus test for 
whether Equinor’s stated desire to leave a social 
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footprint, and their apparent concern for the 
women involved stretches beyond the politics 
of compliance.
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Notes
 1. Th e companies have to run a PEA project for 
as long as the fi elds are in production. Th e con-
cession period for the Peregrino fi eld currently 
extends until 2040.
 2. IBAMA manages environmental licensing pro-
cesses for off shore projects and projects that ex-
tend across state borders. Oil and gas projects 
are handled by IBAMA’s subsection the Direc-
torate of Environmental Licensing/General 
Coordination for Environmental Licensing of 
Marine and Coastal Enterprises (Diretoria de 
Licenciamento Ambiental/ Coordenação Geral 
de Licenciamento Ambiental de Empreendi-
mentos Marinhos e Costeiros).
 3. An overview of Equinor Brazil’s operations 
can be found at https://www.equinor.com/no/
where-we-are/brazil.html.
 4. Th e Peregrino fi eld is co-operated with the Chi-
nese company Sinochem, but Equinor holds the 
operating license.
 5. BRIC is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China.
 6. Th e oil and gas industry in Brazil is regulated by 
the National Regulatory Agency of Petroleum, 
Natural Gas and Biofuel (ANP) (Agência Nacio-
nal do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis).
 7. Special Participation (participação especial) is a 
special payment deducted from the gross reve-
nue of the extraction and production operation 
(Neto et al. 2008: 184n67).
 8. Equinor has a 24/7 “hotline” community mem-
bers can call with questions and concerns as 
well as a corporate email. I have been informed 
that these venues for contact are hardly ever 
used. Th ey also sporadically visit the Fisher-
men’s Colonies and organize events for fi shers, 
such as skin cancer screening. In 2017, Equinor 
and Shell started up a joint voluntary CSR proj-
ect called Mar Atento (Attentive Sea) in order 
to train fi shermen in off shore emergency re-
sponse, e.g. in case of oil spill accidents. I do not 
have qualitative data on this project.
 9. Chico Mendez was a Brazilian rubber tapper, 
trade union leader, and an environmental and 
human rights activist who was assassinated by a 
rancher in 1988.
10. Petrobras has a long track record of spending 
money on corporate social responsibility in 
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various forms, also in the form of diff erent long-
term sponsorships. For example, they have fi -
nanced the large-scale Tamar turtle conservation 
project since 1983. However, what was meant by 
“short-term philanthropy to communities” was 
exemplifi ed to me as, e.g., donating a truck, but 
not funds for maintenance and a driver.
11. Both Equinor and TRANS FOR MAR made con-
stant references to IBAMA and “what IBAMA 
wanted” in their interaction with the women, and 
its logo was printed alongside that of Equinor on 
all material involved in the project.
12. Equinor, “Campos Basin,” https://www.equinor.
com/no/where-we-are/brazil/bacia-de-campos
.html (accessed 27 July 2020).
13. Th e administrative coordinator, with a degree 
in social sciences, has a long history of consul-
tancy, including for IBAMA and the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP). Th e 
didactic coordinator is a university professor 
with a PhD in Environmental Education.
14. See, however, Welker 2014: chap. 4, for a dis-
cussion of participatory approaches as diluted 
critical education.
15. Traditionally women have not ventured out 
onto the open sea, but have engaged in river 
fi shing and collecting crabs in the mangroves; 
they are the backbone of the local processing in-
dustry through fi lleting fi sh and rinsing shrimps 
and crabs.
16. Th is period is set to three months for salt-water 
fi shing and four months for river fi shing. Th e 
compensation is the equivalent to a minimum 
salary per month.
17. Th ese victories are also fragile, e.g. some of the 
women who were added onto the Fisherman’s 
Registry, suddenly disappeared from the list. It 
was not known if this was accidental or simply 
sabotage on the part of the Fishermen’s Colony.
18. See Equinor, “Brazil,” https://www.equinor.com/
no/where-we-are/brazil.html (accessed 27 July 
2020) for additional voluntary projects and 
sponsorships in Equinor Brazil, which this per-
son also is in charge of.
19. Th ese units were restructured in 2018.
20. Pseudonyms.
21. Th e project took place in a community defi ned 
as part of the Peregrino impact area, but not 
in one of the target communities allocated to 
Equinor by IBAMA.
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